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At first sight, it may neither be easy nor obvious to assimilate the conduct of
the Brexit negotiations to the idea of a ‘political Commission’. After all, one of
the principal manifestations of this concept is the capacity of the Commission’s
President to organise the College of Commissioners and to allocate tasks amongst
its members.
Michel Barnier is not a Commissioner; France already has its Commissioner.
Barnier’s method of appointment was not that of a Commissioner; he was not
nominated by a national government and his appointment was not subject to
oversight and approval by the European Parliament.
Instead, Barnier was appointed directly by President Juncker to lead negotiations by
the European Commission acting as the Union’s negotiator under the Article 50 TEU
withdrawal process. As the Press Release accompanying Barnier’s appointment
notes, as well as having the title of ‘Chief Negotiator’ for the Union, Barnier has the
formal status of a Director-General. His appointment as a Director-General of an ad
hoc service is formally an aspect of the internal allocation of senior administrative
roles within the Commission, albeit outside of the mainstream organisation of
directorates-general. On this reading, Barnier is simply a powerful technocrat leading
a negotiation process that – in the end – will need to be signed off politically by the
Council and the European Parliament.
And yet – beyond formal designations – Barnier’s position is more akin to that of a
Commissioner. Not only was that a role he previously exercised – and so, perhaps,
from a status and personal point of view, certain expectations and privileges
continue to attach – it is clear that Barnier’s line of political responsibility goes back
to President Juncker to whom Barnier reports. On behalf of the Commission, it is
Barnier who attends plenary sessions of the European Parliament to brief MEPs
about the negotiations, and – together with President Juncker – he attends meetings
of the European Council in its EU27 formation to inform national leaders about the
progress of talks. As far as the responsibilities of a Director-General go in terms of
the management of a department or a service, it is more likely that Barnier’s Deputy
Sabine Weyland – a Deputy Director-General – will perform that sort of function,
leaving Barnier as the political leader of the task force.
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And so a different reading would see Barnier’s position as a rather better
dramatization of the idea of a political Commission than the quotidian management
of the College of Commissioners delivering on the President’s priorities. Indeed,
the leading role played by Barnier and the European Commission in managing
Brexit may suggest a ‘new supranationalism’ driven by a political Commission
keen to show that it has the capacity to respond to crises. As John Peterson
suggests it is this aspect of the political Commission – the counterweight to the ‘new
intergovernmentalism’ that can be found in the role played by the European Council
in crisis management – which may be of importance.
Appointing an agile Heavyweight
This manifestation of a political Commission has two aspects – personal and
organisational.
At a personal level, the appointment of Barnier to lead the negotiations – rather than
either Juncker himself or one of his team of national-nominated Commissioners
– highlights a kind of political patronage exerted by President Juncker. And the
choice of Barnier – a former Commissioner with experience of, and commitment
to, the operation of the European Single Market may also have been an overt
political signal to the UK that the EU would seek to defend the integrity of its Single
Market and the balance of rights and responsibilities that membership of that market
entails. In this way – and free from the selection process for the appointment of
Commissioners and the haggling that accompanies the distribution of portfolios –
Juncker was able to install a heavyweight political figure at the heart of the Brexit
negotiations and to signal to the UK that the EU would robustly defends its interests.
It is true that Barnier is acting as a Union negotiator operating under European
Council Guidelines and Council negotiating directives. In that respect, the European
Commission is accountable to the Council and the European Council for the conduct
of the negotiations. Barnier and his team need to work with the ad hoc Working Party
that ensures on behalf of the Council and the Member States that the negotiations
remain in line with the mandate given to the Commission. Nonetheless, while the
Commission must account to the other institutions for the progress of negotiations,
at a personal level, Barnier’s line of accountability and reporting is upwards to the
President, as well as outwards to the media and the public in the EU’s management
of its public relations.
At an organisational level, the establishment of the task force that Barnier leads
– Task Force 50 (‘TF50’) – exemplifies a kind of administrative agility needed
by President Juncker in order to exert Commission influence, especially beyond
the routine of day-to-day policymaking carried out by the traditional DGs of the
Commission. Recall also that it was a task force that was established to take charge
of negotiations between the European Commission and the UK Government ahead
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of the 2016 referendum. That task force was headed by a career Commission official
and Director-General, Sir Jonathan Faull. So when we combine the organisational
aspect with the personal aspect, we may conclude that Barnier’s leadership of TF50
is much more obviously an illustration of a political Commission than we might have
assumed at the start.
Exercising Politics in a Bureaucratic Guise
And yet perhaps what is more significant is the ambiguity of the Commission’s and
Barnier’s position: the slippage between the technocratic and the political, or the
exercise of politics in a bureaucratic guise.
The European Commission has presented its conduct of the negotiations as an
orderly, technical and legally-constrained process. After all, the basic structure of
the negotiations is laid down in Articles 50 TEU and 218 TFEU. Nonetheless, the
Commission successfully controlled the timing and sequencing of different phases
of the negotiations in a way that sought to give the Commission maximum leverage
in the talks. This has given the UK and the EU a rather limited amount of time in
which to discuss the future relationship between the UK and the EU. The European
Commission has also continually emphasised that Article 50 is not a legal basis for
that future relationship which can only be determined once the UK has left the EU.
The UK, on the other hand, views the Commission’s conduct of the negotiations as
lacking flexibility – or worse, as selectively flexible – that prevents talks focusing on a
full range of interconnected issues. For example, resolution of the issue of the border
on the island of Ireland – an issue for Phase I of the talks – could never be finally
determined until the UK and the EU discussed and agreed a new trade relationship.
As regards the future trade relationship, the EU has used the UK’s own ‘red lines’ to
rule out different models of cooperation. In a famous graphic that Barnier presented
to the EU27, the Commission sought to show that a CETA-style agreement was the
only logical consequence of Prime Minister May’s approach to Brexit (prior to her
more recent ‘Chequers Plan’). While the Commission may well be right to suggest
that choices made by the UK have consequences for the type of relationship to
which the EU might agree, the illusion of the graphic is that the Commission has no
choice in how it responds.
Pinning Hopes on the Endgame
If the UK is frustrated by what it views as politics disguised as bureaucracy or
‘legalism’, it holds on to the prospect that Barnier and the Commission will be reined
in by the Member States. The UK may be pinning its hopes on the idea that even a
political Commission and a new supranationalism will ultimately yield and bend to
the will of the governments of the EU27 and the politics of intergovernmentalism.
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The heightened discussion in UK politics of a ‘No Deal’ Brexit – with Barnier and
the Commission held responsible for such an outcome – may be a tactic by the UK
to sideline the Commission and to appeal directly to the European Council to take
control to avoid both the UK and the EU falling off a cliff.
In this way, an informal summit of EU27 leaders in Salzburg in September followed
by the formal European Council meeting in October, are pivotal not just in terms of
whether Brexit will be orderly or disorderly, but in revealing whether the European
Council endorses an outcome managed by the Commission, or exerts its own
political authority to dictate the Brexit endgame, including setting any new guidelines
for the negotiations. All of which serves to remind us that a political Commission still
has to establish and maintain its position within the evolving institutional politics of
the EU.
Kenneth Armstrong is author of Brexit Time – Leaving the EU: why, how and when?
(Cambridge University Press 2017)
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